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Abstract 
M&A is a popular strategy for pharmaceutical industry due to high R&D risk and costs. Prior research 
related to post-M&A performance mainly focused on the financial and technology resource perspectives. 
This study aims to provide a new perspective of innovation strategy which is inspired by the research of 
March (1991), who noted the difference between exploration and exploitation. Moreover, we build the 
bridge between M&A and innovation strategy by applying the resource-based view theory. We argue 
that the acquirer’s exploration strategy will negatively influence the post-M&A innovation performance 
and the innovation strategy similarity between the acquirer and the target is beneficial for future 
innovation. Furthermore, we hypothesize that there is a negatively moderating effect caused by the 
acquirer’s exploration strategy on the effect of innovation strategy similarity. On the basis of 89 M&A 
deals in the pharmaceutical industry, our empirical results suggest two important findings. First, post-
M&A innovation performance is influenced by acquirer’s innovation strategy, more specifically, 
acquirer’s exploration is harmful for post-M&A innovation. Second, the similarity effect is moderated 
by acquirer’s innovation strategy. Precisely, acquirer’s exploration will diminish the positive effect of 
similarity. 
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, Pharmaceutical industry, Innovation performance, Innovation 
strategy, Exploration and exploitation, Resource-based view. 
	1 INTRODUCTION 
Innovation is a major source of competitive advantages (Chen et al., 2009). Innovation may happen in 
any part of business operations, such as manufacturing process, product design, customer service, and 
business process. Through innovation, firms are able to renew their assets (Schumpeter, 2013), thus 
leading to new abilities or improved performance. Facing a changing and intensively competitive 
business environment, firms need innovation to maintain or strengthen their survival competence.  
There are several strategies that help firms develop innovation, including internal R&D (Hall and 
Bagchi-Sen, 2002), alliance (Sampson, 2007), and merger and acquisition (M&A) (Bertrand and Zuniga, 
2006; Cassiman et al., 2005). While both alliance and M&A allow firms to access external knowledge 
(Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002), M&A provides stronger control right to external resources (Yin and 
Shanley, 2008), thus leading to greater innovative potential. By performing M&As, companies are able 
to obtain desired resources, for example, market channel, market share, economies of scale, technology, 
or knowledge (Datta and Roumani, 2015; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; King et al., 2008). The Wall 
Street Journal reported that 2015 was the biggest M&A year ever, according to data from a financial 
service firm Dealogic (Farrell, 2015). Global M&A value reached a peak of $4.304 trillion and refreshed 
the 2007 record of $4.296 trillion. The new record for M&A value indicates that M&A is prevalent and 
is considered an effective business strategy. 
M&A has received widespread attention from both business managers and academic researchers. Prior 
studies examined post-M&A performance mainly from the financial perspective (Halpern, 1973). 
Recently, a stream of research highlights technological M&As and their resultant innovation 
performance due to the increasing need for innovation. M&A is effective for technological innovation. 
Developing new knowledge or technology incurs high risk and tremendous costs. For example, it costs 
on average $2.6 billion for pharmaceutical companies to develop a new prescription drug that receives 
market approval, reported by Tufts CSDD 2014 Cost Study (CSDD, 2014). Under such circumstance, 
M&A has several merits, including spreading R&D risk, diversifying knowledge input, eliminating 
potential competitors, creating economy of scale of R&D projects, applying existing knowledge to new 
market, and accessing to exclusive technology from target firms (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Lerner 
et al., 2003). In generally, M&A allows firms to reorganize and refine their R&D resources and projects 
(Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006). 
Focusing on technological M&As, prior studies have found some significant factors affecting post-M&A 
innovation performance, such as knowledge base (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006), 
knowledge similarity (Jaffe, 1986; Makri et al., 2010), and knowledge complementarity (Makri et al., 
2010). While the effects of knowledge on post-M&A innovation performance have been widely 
examined, we noticed that innovation strategy is not considered yet in the literature. Innovation strategy 
concerns about how firms align their resources to develop knowledge or technologies. Here we adopt 
prior studies and define innovation strategy from the view of organizational learning (March, 1991). To 
learn and use knowledge, two opposite strategies, exploration and exploitation, are defined by March 
(1991). Exploration involves distant search, accessing novel knowledge, and thus taking higher risk. In 
contrast, exploitation involves local search and existing knowledge reuse. Prior studies argued that 
deciding the orientation of innovation strategy could be critical for firm performance (He and Wong, 
2004; Quintana-García and Benavides-Velasco, 2008). These research emphasized that the two 
innovation strategies require different structures, processes and even cultures. In the context of M&A, 
two organizations must pay efforts on integration and resolving conflicts. Besides affecting how the 
organization designs their process, innovation strategy also influences the process of integration. 
However, little is known about the role of innovation strategy in technological-driven M&A, especially 
the effect on post-M&A innovation performance. 
In this paper, we explore the impact of the acquirer’s innovation strategy and the effect of innovation 
strategy similarity between the acquirer and target on post-M&A innovation performance. Furthermore, 
we consider the moderating effect of the acquirer’s innovation strategy on the similarity of innovation 
	strategy. We aim to provide a new perspective to the literature and build the linkage between M&A 
research and innovation strategy literature through the resource-based view (RBV) theory. 
Our study makes several contributions to the M&A literature. First, we show evidence for the effect of 
innovation strategy on post-M&A innovation performance. Second, we further examine the effect of the 
innovation strategy similarity and the interaction effect of the acquirer’s innovation strategy and the 
innovation strategy similarity. Third, this study builds a linkage between M&A literature and innovation 
strategy research by RBV. Fourth, we obtain several practical and academic suggestions that can inspire 
more managerial methods and research in the future. 
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Our study focuses on how innovation strategy influences post-M&A innovation performance. Prior 
studies had investigated post-M&A performance from different perspectives. Most traditional research 
focused on the financial perspective (King et al., 2008). Despite the financial perspective, some studies 
have transferred their research attention to technological performance and factors (Ahuja and Katila, 
2001; Datta and Roumani, 2015; Makri et al., 2010), due to the increasing importance of technological 
M&As. Rapid changes in technologies force firms to maintain their innovation ability to meet new 
challenges and requirements. Innovation is especially critical for high-tech industries, and M&A seems 
to be a popular strategy for companies to maintain their innovation through gaining external resources 
(Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). The main research question from the technological perspective is 
similar to that from the financial perspective: what factors influence post-M&A innovation performance? 
Prior studies which applied the technological perspective provide several inspiring technological factors 
such as knowledge base (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006; King, 2008; Datta and Roumani, 
2015), technology similarity or relatedness (Jaffe, 1986; Cassiman et al., 2008; Makri et al., 2010) and 
R&D abilities (King et al., 2008). These studies provide evidences for the importance of knowledge 
resources on post-M&A innovation performance. For example, Ahuja and Katila (2001) showed the size 
of the acquired knowledge base has a positive effect on post-M&A innovation performance. All these 
studies aim to reveal the important technological resources which affect post-M&A innovation 
performance; however, limited studies paid their attention to innovation strategy in the M&A literature 
(Van Deusen and Mueller, 1999). 
According to March’s (1991) research in organizational learning, R&D innovation is a process of 
searching and recombining knowledge. Two opposite innovation strategies have been commonly studied:  
exploration and exploitation (Atuahene-Gima, 2005; Benner and Tushman, 2003; Quintana-García and 
Benavides-Velasco, 2008). Exploration involves novel knowledge, distant search, uncertainty, and 
return variation. It usually generates stronger and longer competitive advantage than exploitation due to 
its novelty and rarity. Nevertheless, exploration bears higher risk and variance (March, 1991). In contrast, 
exploitation seems to be more stable and predictable because it is relevant to routines and existing 
knowledge reuse. However, it might be harmful for firms in the long-term due to the lack of novel 
knowledge and novel chances. As March (1991) mentioned, exploration and exploitation compete for 
resources, thus leading to a resource allocation issue. Firms need to balance their innovation strategy 
between exploration and exploitation. What is the best strategy for a firm to reach a balance between 
exploration and exploitation has invoked another stream of research (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; 
He and Wong, 2004; Jansen et al., 2005). We bring this notion into M&A literature by asking how 
different innovation strategies influence post-M&A innovation performance. In order to build the bridge 
between innovation strategy and M&A, we adopted the theory of resource-based view (RBV) in this 
research, following Greve’s (2007) research on innovation strategy. 
The RBV theory (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984) concerns resources as essentials of any activity in a 
company. According to RBV, firm innovation is supported by knowledge resource. In other words, a 
different level of knowledge resource leads to a different level of innovation performance (Bierly and 
Chakrabarti, 1996). Moreover, some researchers argued that slack resources are influential to a firm’s 
innovation performance (Nohria and Gulati, 1996; Schoonhoven et al., 1990). A possible explanation is 
	that slack resources allow firms to perform slack search or conduct projects that are not derived from 
market expectations but hold scientific potential (Levinthal and March, 1981; March and Olsen, 1976). 
While most of the research argued that there is a positive relationship between the amount of slack 
resources and innovation performance (Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1993; Zajac et al., 1991), Greve 
(2007) extended March’s (1991) study and further examined the relationship between slack resources 
and innovation strategy. The arrangement for resources on exploration and exploitation not only affects 
resource allocation, but also influences the administration, structure, and culture. For example, an 
exploratory firm may spend more resources to organize knowledge from different fields, more time to 
collect novel knowledge or hire more inventors from different backgrounds. When M&A occurs, these 
arrangements between firms may cause synergy or impediment. It is worth noting that we mainly discuss 
the effect of innovation strategy in view of exploration since exploration and exploitation are opposite 
concepts and discussing them separately is trivial. 
2.1 Acquirer’s innovation (exploratory) strategy 
We argue that the acquirer’s exploratory strategy will negatively influence post-M&A innovation. 
Unlike an alliance or joint venture, M&A is an unbalanced deal between acquirer and target. The 
acquirers usually have greater power than targets thus being dominant in M&A. Therefore, the acquirer 
has stronger influence on the post-M&A performance than the target in most cases. According to March 
(1991), exploration is closely associated with slack resources. Sufficient slack resources allow firms to 
perform experiments and more lax performance monitoring, both of which are critical to exploratory 
innovation (Lounamaa and March, 1987). Greve (2007) also pointed out that even though both 
exploration and exploitation are promoted by slack resources, exploration is more sensitive to slack 
resources because exploration needs to bear a long-term horizon study, distant search, and extra 
experiment cost.  
M&A can be a difficult challenge for firms (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). Before the acquirer can 
create competitive advantages through M&A, it needs to integrate the target’s resources, such as human 
resources (Buono et al., 1989) and incompatible culture (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1988). Therefore, 
all processes in M&A consume the slack resources from both firms. Since there is a positive relationship 
between firm resources and firm performance (Zajac et al., 1991), conducting M&A activities may harm 
the post-M&A innovation performance due to the consumption of resources. Moreover, exploration 
demands more resources than exploitation. Therefore, a firm with a higher level of exploration strategy 
should have fewer slack resources than a firm with a lower level of exploration strategy. We thus 
hypothesize: 
H1: The acquirer’s innovation (exploratory) strategy will influence post-M&A innovation performance. 
That is, the more exploratory strategy the acquirer has, the worse the post-M&A innovation 
performance is. 
2.2 Similarity of innovation strategy between acquirer and target 
Prior studies have demonstrated the effect of similarity between acquirer and target on post-M&A 
innovation performance. For example, Ahuja and Katila (2001) studied the relative size of the 
knowledge base between acquirer and target, and the relatedness of the knowledge base between 
acquirer and target. Jaffe (1986) and Makri et al. (2010) examined the technology scope similarity 
between acquirer and target. Following these research studies, we take a dyadic perspective and examine 
the effect of innovation strategy similarity between acquirer and target. 
As mentioned in the previous section, innovation strategy is relevant to knowledge search and resource 
allocation. Different innovation strategies between two firms may cause conflict and require additional 
coordinating resources. Gomes et al. (2013) summarized important factors in the pre-merger phase (e.g., 
choice and evaluation of the strategic partner) and in the post-merger phase (e.g., integration strategies), 
and suggested that the existing literature for partner selection can be classified into two perspectives: 
“strategic fit” (Lubatkin, 1987) and “organizational fit” (Angwin, 2000; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; 
	Weber et al., 1996). Moreover, the research concludes that fitness in strategy and fitness in organization 
are helpful for firms’ integration or cooperation. For example, if the acquirer is more exploratory while 
the target orientates toward exploitation, their dissimilar strategies may create conflict among inventors 
and administrators of the two firms and thus incur higher costs for integration (Lubatkin, 1983) because 
of different organizational structures and cultures. Organizational culture has been widely studied 
(Cooper and Cartwright, 1992; Weber and Pliskin, 1996; Weber et al., 2012), concluding that distant 
culture may cause conflict, which leads to a negative effect on firm performance. The R&D culture in 
each firm is shaped by its innovation strategy. Therefore, we argue that a higher similarity of innovation 
strategy between acquirer and target is beneficial for later integration, thus leading to greater post-M&A 
innovation performance. Note that if the similarity of innovation strategy between acquirer and target is 
relatively high, it means their level of exploration (or exploitation) is similar. 
H2:  The similarity of innovation strategy between acquirer and target will positively influence the post-
M&A innovation performance. That is, the more similar the innovation strategy between acquirer 
and target is, the higher the post-M&A innovation performance is. 
2.3 Moderating effect of acquirer’s innovation strategy on the relationship between 
similarity of innovation strategy and post-M&A performance 
After considering the innovation strategy of the acquirer and the similarity of innovation strategy 
between acquirer and target, we now take a further step and look at the interaction between these two 
effects. While both exploration and exploitation are susceptible to risk and resource variation, 
exploratory innovation is more resource-consuming and riskier, therefore, it is more sensitive to the lack 
of resources or variation. Moreover, M&A consumes many kinds of resources, including administrative 
resources and capital resources to coordinate and integrate the M&A process.  
As we mentioned before, the acquirer has more power in most M&A deals, that is, the acquirer needs to 
bear more risk and responsibility because the acquirer must coordinate and integrate the innovation 
resources acquired from the target and its own resources. It means that the acquirer suffers from spending 
slack resources including capital and administrative resources on M&A. Under such circumstances, a 
higher-risk innovation strategy seems to be more harmful for post-M&A innovation. Thus, we argue that 
when the acquirer is more exploratory, the positive effect of the similarity of innovation strategy between 
itself and the target on post-M&A innovation performance will diminish because the acquirer has less 
slack resources to coordinate and integrate the innovation resources from the target firm. Thus, we 
propose:  
H3: The acquirer’s innovation (exploratory) strategy will negatively moderate the effect of the 
innovation strategy similarity on post-M&A innovation performance.  
3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Sample and data 
Our research focuses on technological M&As, that is, an acquirer conducts a merger or acquisition to 
collect external knowledge or existing technology. To construct a general definition of technological 
M&A, we adopt the definition made by Ahuja and Katila (2001) as: “acquired firms obtaining even a 
single patent in the 5 years prior to the acquisition are classified as technological acquisitions.” This 
definition is suitable for our study, because we use patent data to measure a firm’s innovation strategy 
(i.e., the extent of exploration) and its innovation performance. 
3.1.1 Merger and acquisition data 
We followed prior studies and collected from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Platinum 
database M&A deals, which were announced between 1990 and 2009. The SDC database is owned by 
	Thomson Reuters and collects announced mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and alliance data 
worldwide valued at one million dollars or more (Frey and Hussinger, 2006). 
To ensure that the M&A deals included in our study involve technology innovation, we followed 
previous studies and chose M&A deals from a high-technology industry, i.e., the pharmaceutical 
industry (SICs: 2833, 2834, 2835, 2836) (Paruchuri et al., 2006; Zaheer et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2007). 
We chose the pharmaceutical industry for several reasons. First, technological or scientific innovation 
is a vital ability for firms in the pharmaceutical industry (Morton, 2002), and firms in this industry have 
a propensity to patent their innovation (Levin et al., 1987). Second, M&A is popular in the 
pharmaceutical industry (Graves and Langowitz, 1993). Third, most M&As in the pharmaceutical 
industry are conducted for technological assets rather than other business resources (Thompson, 2001).  
We filtered the data by two constraints. First, because we focus on how external factors influence post-
M&A innovation performance, self-acquisition should be excluded. We removed all deals where the 
acquirer and target belong to the same company. Second, to make sure that the acquirer has sufficient 
power to access the target’s knowledge resources, we limited the percentage share acquired after the 
transaction to greater than 50 percent.  
Since the technology resources are at firm-level, we cannot decompose them into the subsidiary-level, 
therefore we excluded all M&A deals that involved a subsidiary, department, or branch. The advantage 
of such an approach is that the effect of M&A will not be disturbed by the innovation of other units and 
the measurements of technology resources can be completed. To exclude M&As involving subsidiaries, 
departments and branches, we manually inspected each M&A case collected from the SDC database. As 
the SDC database provides a brief description of each M&A case, our coders had enough information 
to distinguish the unit level of acquirer and target. The coders were separated into two groups for a 
process of cross-validation. All unmatched results were manually checked by a third coder. 
3.1.2 Financial data 
Following previous research, we need to control alternative effects by adopting financial variables. We 
collected financial data of the acquirer from COMPUSTAT database. This database collects financial 
data of publicly traded firms in many countries, including the U.S. 
To ensure these variables are controlled in our model, we excluded M&A cases where the financial data 
of the acquirers are missing. In terms of target firms, we were not concerned with their financial variables 
since we only focused on technological-driven M&As, meaning that the acquirer buys or merges a target 
for its technological assets. This assumption also helps us extend the sample size by including M&As 
which involve private target companies. 
3.1.3 Patent data 
To measure the technological variables, we followed prior studies and adopted patent as a proxy for 
assessing company innovation characteristics (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Jaffe, 1986). Since the U.S. is 
the largest and primary market, many companies applied their inventions for patents in the U.S. 
Therefore, we chose USPTO (United States Patent & Trademark Office) as the patent data source. For 
each company, we searched for its granted patents from 1985 to 2012 based on their application date, 
and excluded deals where the acquirer or target has no patent applications in the five years before the 
M&A.  
We faced the challenge of matching assignees’ names when searching patents. A company may use 
different names when applying patents. For example, Bayerische Motoren Werke AG has patents with 
the abbreviated name “BMW,” and the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company has a mistyped 
assignee name “Taiwan Seimconductor Manufacture Company.” Furthermore, the name of a firm taken 
from the SDC database and COMPUSTAT may not be the name used in the firm’s patents. To solve the 
name matching issue, we first used the truncated name extracted from COMPUSTAT for the acquirer 
and from the SDC database for the target.  
	The truncated name is formed using the following algorithm: For each company name, we segmented 
the name by spaces. For example, Apple Computer Company was segmented into “Apple,” “Computer,” 
and “Company,” then we dropped the last word generic to most of companies (i.e., we deleted the 
“Company” from the name). Subsequently, we used “Apple Computer” to perform a fuzzy search in the 
patent database. However, many irrelevant names may be retrieved by the search engine, for example, 
“Apple Computer Communication Cooperation.” Therefore, for each focal company, two coders 
inspected possible names retrieved by the fuzzy search to find the names that really refer to the focal 
company, i.e., Apple Computer Company in this case.  
We were able to find all granted patents of each company following the name matching process. Finally, 
we aggregated the alliance data from SDC, financial data from COMPUSTAT and patent data from 
USPTO to form our research sample. We collected 89 M&A cases as our final sample.  
3.2 Model 
Following a previous study (Zhang et al., 2007), a negative binomial regression was employed in this 
research for two reasons. First, our dependent variable is a count, non-negative variable. Second, the 
mean and variance are far beyond similar in our data set, which means the Poisson regression is not 
suitable for our study. For robustness check, we also applied the Poisson regression model and found no 
difference.  
3.3 Variable definition and operationalization 
3.3.1 Dependent variable 
Post-M&A innovation performance. We assessed the innovation performance of acquirer by counting 
the forward citations received by the acquirer’s granted patents applied after M&A (Valentini, 2012). It 
is widely agreed that the number of forward citations implies the quality or impact of a patent. In this 
study, we only consider acquirer’s patents since acquiring external knowledge by acquirers is the main 
reason of technological M&As. That is, to measure the post-M&A innovation performance, we take into 
consideration only acquirer’s patents after M&A. While an older patent may receive more forward 
citations because it has existed for a longer time, the impact of the patent is also decreasing because new 
technologies may replace older ones. Therefore, we followed Ahuja and Katila (2001) and collected all 
forward citations for every successful (i.e., granted) patent application filed within four years after M&A. 
3.3.2 Independent variables 
Acquirer’s innovation (exploratory) strategy. Exploration is an innovation strategy that a firm creates 
novel or radical knowledge beyond its existing knowledge base (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Rosenkopf 
and Nerkar, 2001). We followed prior research (Benner and Tushman, 2002; Katila and Ahuja, 2002; 
Phelps, 2010; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) and used patent citations to measure the level of an 
acquirer’s exploration. Patents cite prior relevant patents or scientific articles to prove their technological 
novelty and advance. These cited patents or articles are recognized as the source of knowledge base 
(Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cloodt et al., 2006). Since innovation is a process of searching prior existing 
knowledge and combining or transforming them into a new knowledge, we used backward citations to 
measure the level of exploring knowledge from novel sources. 
Specifically, if an acquirer is involved in an M&A in year t, then we collected all the patents applied by 
the acquirer within 5 years before the focal M&A and eventually granted.1 That is, patents applied from 
year t-4 to year t were collected. Then we traced these patents’ backward citations as their knowledge 
source. Our notion following Phelps (2010) is that exploration tends to perform distant search thus 
leading to novel knowledge source. For each backward citation, if it was cited by the acquirer’s other 
																																								 										
1	We also changed the time window of independent variables to 4 and 6 years, and the results are mostly consistent with the 
main model.	
	patents in the past seven years or it belongs to the acquirer, we labeled it as an “old citation.” However, 
an “old citation” may turn to a “new citation” if the acquirer does not access this knowledge for some 
period of time and becomes unfamiliar with it. Phelps (2010) chose a 7-year window because the median 
age of backward citations in the telecom technologies industry is 6.5 year (Hicks et al., 2001). We 
applied the same time window to determine the novelty of a backward citation. For example, if a 
backward citation was cited in year t, we traced back to year t-6. If any other patent of the acquirer 
within this specific time window cited the same citation, then this citation was marked as an “old 
citation.” On the other hand, the condition of new citation will last for three years, that is, a new citation 
cited in year t can be cited again in year t, t+1, and t+2 and will still be labelled as a “new citation.” 
After labeling all backward citations, the exploration is measured by dividing the number of new 
citations by the number of total citations: !"#$%&'(%&)*( = [ -./	1*('(*%-2*((%('$	1*('(*%-2*(((−4 ] 5 
This measure is bounded between 0 and 1. A higher value implies more exploratory and less exploitative. 
Innovation strategy similarity between acquirer and target. To compute this variable, we first used the 
method mentioned in the last section and computed the exploratory strategy for acquirer and target 
separately. Since the exploratory strategy is bounded between 0 and 1, we measured the similarity 
between two firms by the following formula: 7*8*$'&*()9: = 1 − |!9 − !:|!9 + !: + > 
where E@ is the level of exploration of the acquirer, and EA is the level of exploration of the target. We 
added a very small number > (in this study, we set > as 0.00001) to prevent the hazard of a zero 
denominator. The similarity is bounded between 0 and 1, and a higher similarity implies that the acquirer 
has a similar innovation strategy to that of the target. 
3.3.3 Control variables 
To control for possible confounding effects, we included several control variables. First, in terms of 
financial influence, we included acquirer’s firm size (Ahuja and Katila, 2001), which is measured by 
the number of employees, acquirer’s current ratio (Singh, 1986), acquirer’s R&D intensity (Griliches, 
1990), year dummies and SIC dummies.  
Second, in terms of technological influence, commonly examined by prior studies, we added three 
technological variables as our control variables. Pre-sample size was added to control the original 
innovation ability of the acquirer (Silverman, 1999). While prior research has argued that the technology 
similarity between acquirer and target might influence the post-M&A innovation performance, 
technology similarity was added as another control variable. To measure technology similarity, we 
tabulated the technology fields of the acquirer and target by the 4-digit IPC class of their patents that 
were filed in the preceding 5-years. Then we computed the cosine similarity of the vectors representing 
their technology fields (Ahuja and Katila, 2001).  
Some research has also examined the technology diversity of a firm (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and 
argued that the firm’s technology diversity may have a relationship with its absorptive ability, which has 
an effect on innovation performance. Therefore, we added technology diversity of acquirer and 
technology diversity of target to control for the influence from the two firms’ absorptive ability. We 
constructed the technology diversity of a firm according to the Herfindahl index using the following 
formula: 
B.1ℎ-%$%D)	E*F.&2*()G: = 1 − ( IGJ:IG:::KL )N
O
J  
	where NQA is the total number of successful patent applications filed by firm i in year t. NQRA is the number 
of successful patent applications in IPC class j by firm i in year t. In addition, J is the number of all 
classes obtained by firm i. A higher value indicates that the firm has a more diverse technology stock.  
Third, Ahuja and Katila (2001) performed a longitudinal study on technological M&As and found that 
the attributes of the knowledge base are important factors. Thus, we included their measurements as 
control variables. The absolute size of knowledge base of the target is constructed by the following 
procedure. First, we collected the successful patent applications of the target that were filed in the 
preceding 5 years. Then we combined these patents and their backward citations into a set (denoted as 
the knowledge base of the target firm), whose size represents the absolute size of the knowledge base of 
the firm. The relative size of knowledge base is the ratio of knowledge base size between acquirer and 
target. Specifically, if the size of the acquirer’s knowledge base is greater than that of the target’s 
knowledge base, the relative size of knowledge base is computed by dividing the size of the target’s 
knowledge base by the size of the acquirer’s knowledge base. However, when the size of the acquirer’s 
knowledge base is smaller than that of the target’s knowledge base, the relative size of knowledge base 
is computed by dividing the size of the acquirer’s knowledge base by the size of the target’s knowledge 
base. Finally, the relatedness of knowledge base between acquirer and target is constructed by 
computing the cosine similarity of the knowledge base grouped by 4-digit IPC class of the acquirer and 
target. 
4 RESULT 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables adopted in this research. The 
average number of received forward citations in 4 years after M&A is 742.92 and the standard deviation 
is 1731.01, indicating that in the pharmaceutical industry several firms are much more dominant in 
innovation performance due to the high deviation compared to the mean. On average, the technological 
diversity of the acquirer is 0.69, higher than the average of the target (i.e., 0.41). While acquirers usually 
possess more resources, it is reasonable that acquirers have a higher average technological diversity, i.e., 
a better absorptive ability, than targets have. The average cosine similarity of the technology portfolio 
between acquirer and target is 0.49 and deviation is 0.34. This number indicates that in most M&A, 
acquirers seek targets with relevant technology or knowledge to the acquirers themselves. 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that the acquirer’s innovation (exploratory) strategy will negatively influence the 
post-M&A innovation performance. As shown in Model 2 of Table 2, “Acquirer Exploration” is negative 
and significant (β = -2.5118, p < 0.01), thus providing support to Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 posited 
that the similarity of innovation strategy between acquirer and target will positively influence the post-
M&A innovation performance. As shown in Model 3 of Table 2, the variable “Similarity of Exploration 
between Acquirer and Target” is positive but not significant (β = 0.2975), thereby providing no support 
to Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 3 examined the interaction effect between the acquirer’s exploratory strategy and the 
innovation strategy similarity between acquirer and target. Our result provides support to Hypothesis 3, 
where the interaction “Acquirer exploration × Similarity of exploration between acquirer and target” is 
negative and significant (β = -9.0269, p < 0.05). In summary, the level of acquirer’s exploration seems 
to be harmful for post-M&A innovation performance. There is no support for the positive effect of 
innovation strategy similarity on post-M&A innovation performance. However, we found the interaction 
effect between acquirer’s exploratory strategy and the innovation strategy similarity. Acquirer’s 
exploratory strategy negatively moderates the effect of innovation strategy similarity on post-M&A 
innovation performance. 
	 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations for all variables 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Acquirer’s post-M&A 
innovation performance 
742.92  1731.01              
2. R&D intensity 1.51  4.04  -0.14             
3. Current ratio 4.27  4.41  -0.23  0.27            
4. Firm size 22.51  35.02  0.36  -0.22  -0.39           
5. Pre-sample size 2070.49 3558.09  0.67  -0.18  -0.27  0.52          
6. Technology similarity 0.49  0.34  -0.10  0.10  0.16  -0.05  0.00         
7. Acquirer technology 
diversity 
0.69  0.20  0.29  -0.40  -0.26  0.43  0.36  -0.07        
8. Target technology 
diversity 
0.41  0.29  -0.03  0.11  -0.09  0.13  0.02  0.17  0.10       
9. Relative size of target 
knowledge base 
150.94  367.84  0.15  -0.10  -0.13  0.44  0.19  0.16  0.07  0.30      
10. Absolute size of target 
knowledge base 
0.25  0.30  -0.15  0.27  0.38  -0.15  -0.22  0.13  -0.17  0.31  0.37     
11. Relatedness of target 
knowledge base 
18.17  38.35  0.05  -0.06  -0.03  0.25  0.18  0.20  0.17  0.32  0.56  0.35    
12. Acquirer exploration 0.59  0.20  0.06  0.05  -0.10  -0.01  -0.04  -0.08  0.00  -0.07  0.05  0.04  -0.06   
13. Similarity of exploration 
between acquirer and target 
0.77  0.18  0.14  0.13  -0.06  0.20  0.13  0.13  0.25  0.14  0.13  0.20  0.15  0.53  
 
	Table 2. Effect of innovation strategy on post-M&A innovation performance: Negative binomial regression  
Variable 1 2 3 
N 89 89 89 
Constant -1.5667† 
[0.9287] 
-0.5189 
[0.9723] 
-3.3044* 
[1.4747] 
R&D intensity -0.0597 
[0.0403] 
-0.0369 
[0.0398] 
-0.0413 
[0.0404] 
Current ratio -0.0259 
[0.0356] 
-0.0330 
[0.0349] 
-0.0386 
[0.0333] 
Firm size 0.0064 
[0.0045] 
0.0083† 
[0.0045] 
0.0092* 
[0.0045] 
Pre-sample size 0.0002*** 
[0.0000] 
0.0001** 
[0.0000] 
0.0001** 
[0.0000] 
Technology similarity 1.9731*** 
[0.9682] 
1.1791** 
[0.3844] 
1.0410** 
[0.3950] 
Acquirer technology diversity 0.3331* 
[0.4333] 
1.6400† 
[0.9630] 
1.6346 
[1.0613] 
Target technology diversity -0.0006 
[0.0004] 
0.5485 
[0.4073] 
0.3958 
[0.4067] 
Relative size of target  
    knowledge base 
-0.0818 
[0.6705] 
-0.0001 
[0.0004] 
-0.0003 
[0.0004] 
Absolute size of target  
    knowledge base 
0.0100 
[0.0036] 
-0.8430 
[0.6416] 
-0.5497 
[0.6233] 
Relatedness of target  
    knowledge base 
1.5907*** 
[0.4075] 
0.0099** 
[0.0034] 
0.0099** 
[0.0033] 
Acquirer exploration  -2.5118** 
[0.8566] 
4.2937* 
[2.8784] 
Similarity of exploration  
    between acquirer and target 
 0.2975 
[0.8291] 
4.3438* 
[1.7927] 
Acquirer exploration ⋅ Similarity of 
    exploration between acquirer and target 
  -9.0269* 
[3.5818] 
Note. p < 0.1; p∗) < 0.05;	 p∗∗ < 0.01;	 p∗∗∗ < 0.001 
Standard errors are in brackets. Year dummies and SIC code dummies are included, but not shown. 
To explain the significant interaction effect, we plotted the results of interaction effect following Makri 
et al. (2010). In Figure 1, the effect of innovation strategy similarity for high and low level of acquirer’s 
exploration was demonstrated. We computed the high and low level of acquirer’s exploration by adding 
one standard deviation from its mean and subtracting one standard deviation from the mean, respectively. 
As shown in Figure 1, when acquirer’s exploration is low (i.e., acquirer being exploitative), the 
innovation strategy similarity between acquirer and target has a positive effect on post-M&A 
performance. However, when the acquirer’s exploration is high (i.e., acquirer being exploratory), not 
only does the innovation strategy similarity have a lesser effect, but it also shows that the effect of this 
similarity even becomes negative. It is worth noting that the upward slope of effect of exploitative 
acquirers is larger than the downward slope of effect of exploratory acquirers. This indicates that if the 
acquirer’s innovation strategy is fixed, an exploitative acquirer has better effectiveness than an 
exploratory acquirer in the context of merging/acquiring targets with different orientations of innovation 
strategy. 
	 
Figure 1. Interaction effects of the acquirer exploration with innovation strategy similarity on 
post-M&A innovation performance. 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In an effort to understand how the innovation strategy influences post-M&A innovation performance, 
we proposed a novel perspective that applies exploration and exploitation into M&A literature. The 
result for H1 is supported. Through examining the effect of acquirer’s innovation strategy and the effect 
of innovation strategy similarity between acquirer and target, we concluded that before performing 
M&A deals, a high level of exploration of the acquirer seems to be harmful to its post-M&A innovation 
performance, as we expected. However, our findings did not support H2, which means the similarity of 
innovation strategy between acquirer and target does not significantly influence post-M&A innovation 
performance. The surprising result indicates that only focusing on this dyadic factor between acquirer 
and target is not sufficient for explaining innovation performance resulted from post-M&A or any other 
forms of inter-firm cooperation. There are two possible reasons for this insignificant result. First is that 
our data is limited to the pharmaceutical industry, thus leading to a bounded sample size. Second, prior 
research focusing on similarity of knowledge concluded that the best strategy is balance, which means 
too similar or too dissimilar are both harmful for innovation (Cloodt et al., 2006). Following this notion, 
the similarity of innovation strategy could be more complex and needs to be examined by generalizing 
or improving the model. Even though H2 is not supported, the effect of similar innovation strategy still 
influences post-M&A innovation performance under the moderating effect of acquirer’s innovation 
strategy, which is proved by examining H3. Our research does provide some theoretical contributions to 
the literature and several managerial implications, highlighted in the following subsections. 
5.1 Theoretical contributions 
We are contributing to the stream of M&A literature by investigating a new technological perspective. 
Most of the previous studies have adopted a financial perspective and confirmed the effects of different 
financial variables. For example, Elgers and Clark (1980) found that a merger is beneficial to a firm’s 
stock value; Healy et al. (1992) found that cash flow is significantly improved after mergers, resulting 
from increases in asset productivity. On the other hand, relatively few studies have examined the M&A 
performance in terms of technological factors. Most studies in technological M&A literature focused on 
knowledge characteristics including size of knowledge base, relativeness of knowledge base, etc. Yet no 
M&A research has considered the effect of innovation strategy. The innovation strategy of companies 
has been considered as influential to innovation performance, especially in high-tech industries. Our 
study broadens the horizon of M&A literature by investigating the innovation strategy and the innovation 
strategy similarity between acquirer and target. In addition, we further examined the interaction effect 
and found a significant moderating effect from the acquirer’s exploration strategy. Moreover, we built 
High AE
Low AE
High 
performance           
Low 
performance
Low similarity                                                High similarity
AE = Acquirer exploration
	the linkage between the M&A literature and innovation strategy by the RBV theory. RBV and related 
research help us to explain how innovation strategy affects post-M&A innovation performance, and also 
create a framework for applying RBV into M&A or other forms of inter-firm cooperation literature. 
5.2 Managerial implications 
This study provides some meaningful insights for practical management in M&A. For those firms who 
want to carry out M&As, we suggest that they should rearrange their innovation resources before 
performing M&A deals. Our result shows that a high exploitation is helpful for post-M&A innovation 
performance. To achieve exploitation, firms can take the following strategies. First, the administration 
of the firm should encourage its inventors to reuse existing knowledge whenever possible, and promote 
cooperation between employees to increase knowledge reuse. Second, R&D managers should focus on 
improving existing projects or core abilities rather than develop radically novel knowledge or innovation. 
Third, in terms of human resource management, an employee whose background or expertise is relevant 
to the core abilities should be more preferred. Fourth, a knowledge management system is considered 
helpful for intra-firm knowledge sharing and transfer, thus promoting knowledge reuse and increasing 
exploitation. 
Furthermore, the interaction between the acquirer’s innovation strategy and similarity of innovation 
strategy indicates that compared to searching for exploitative targets, the acquirer should pay more 
attention to organizing its own strategy toward exploitation. That is, we suggest that when a firm is 
looking for M&A opportunities, it should first focus on coordinating its own innovation resources. When 
the cost of coordinating the innovation resources is too high, the firm can further consider the innovation 
strategy of the target.  
Finally, following prior studies, we employed technological similarity as one of our control variables 
and this also gave us a practical management hint. For companies who mean to acquire external 
resources through M&As, a target with a similar technology portfolio is more preferable and should be 
placed at higher priority. 
5.3 Future work 
There are several limitations in this study, which represent directions for future research. First, our study 
is bounded in the pharmaceutical industry. Even though the pharmaceutical industry is recognized as a 
high-tech industry (Zaheer, 2010; Paruchuri, 2006, Zhang et al., 2007), there are still many possible 
high-tech industries remaining, such as the aero industry or chemical industry. We hope this study can 
be generalized by testing our proposed hypotheses on a variety of industries, thus increasing the external 
generalizability.  
Second, our study is anchored on patent analysis, thus leaving room for other analysis techniques. Patent 
quality is adopted in this research to measure post-M&A innovation performance. However, many other 
measurements such as profit (Jaffe, 1986), market value (Jaffe, 1986) and time to patent (Datta and 
Roumani, 2015) are also relevant to innovation performance from a different angle.  
Finally, this study focused on M&As. However, many other types of inter-firm cooperation should be 
considered in the future, such as alliance and joint ventures. Despite the essential difference, any 
technology-oriented cooperation seems to be suitable to be examined under the notion of innovation 
strategy. We look forward to future research extending our research model to other types of inter-firm 
cooperation. 
Acknowledgement 
This work was supported in part by the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of China 
(Taiwan) under the grant MOST 104-2410-H-002-143-MY3. 
	References 
Ahuja, G. and Katila, R. (2001). Technological acquisitions and the innovation performance of 
acquiring firms: A longitudinal study. Strategic Management Journal, 22(3), 197-220. 
Andriopoulos, C. and Lewis, M. W. (2009). Exploitation-exploration tensions and organizational 
ambidexterity: Managing paradoxes of innovation. Organization science, 20(4), 696-717. 
Angwin, D. (2000). Implementing Successful Post-acquisition Management: Financial Times Prentice 
Hall. 
Atuahene-Gima, K. (2005). Resolving the capability—rigidity paradox in new product innovation. 
Journal of marketing, 69(4), 61-83. 
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of management, 17(1), 
99-120. 
Benner, M. J. and Tushman, M. L. (2002). Process management and technological innovation: A 
longitudinal study of the photography and paint industries. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
47(4), 676-707. 
Benner, M. J. and Tushman, M. L. (2003). Exploitation, exploration, and process management: The 
productivity dilemma revisited. Academy of management review, 28(2), 238-256. 
Bertrand, O. and Zuniga, P. (2006). R&D and M&A: Are cross-border M&A different? An 
investigation on OECD countries. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(2), 
401-423. 
Bierly, P. and Chakrabarti, A. (1996). Generic knowledge strategies in the US pharmaceutical industry. 
Strategic Management Journal, 17(S2), 123-135. 
Buono, A. F., Weiss, J. W. and Bowditch, J. L. (1989). Paradoxes in acquisition and merger consulting: 
Thoughts and recommendations. Consultation: An International Journal, 8(3), 145-159. 
Cassiman, B., Colombo, M. G., Garrone, P. and Veugelers, R. (2005). The impact of M&A on the 
R&D process: An empirical analysis of the role of technological-and market-relatedness. 
Research Policy, 34(2), 195-220. 
Cassiman, B. and Veugelers, R. (2002). R&D cooperation and spillovers: Some empirical evidence 
from Belgium. The American Economic Review, 92(4), 1169-1184. 
Chen, Y.-S., Lin, M.-J. J. and Chang, C.-H. (2009). The positive effects of relationship learning and 
absorptive capacity on innovation performance and competitive advantage in industrial 
markets. Industrial Marketing Management, 38(2), 152-158. 
Cloodt, M., Hagedoorn, J. and Van Kranenburg, H. (2006). Mergers and acquisitions: Their effect on 
the innovative performance of companies in high-tech industries. Research Policy, 35(5), 642-
654. 
Cohen, W. M. and Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and 
innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128-152. 
Cooper, C. and Cartwright, S. (1992). Mergers and Acquisitions: The human factor: Oxford: 
Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd. 
CSDD. (2014). Cost to develop and win marketing approval for a new drug is $2.6 billion: Tufts 
Centor for the Study of Drug Development. 
Datta, P. and Roumani, Y. (2015). Knowledge-acquisitions and post-acquisition innovation 
performance: A comparative hazards model. European Journal of Information Systems, 24(2), 
202-226. 
Farrell, M. (2015). 2015 becomes the biggest M&A year ever: The Wall Street Journal. 
Frey, R. and Hussinger, K. (2006). The role of technology in M&As: A firm-level comparison of cross-
border and domestic deals. Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies: Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Research Centre. 
Graves, S. B. and Langowitz, N. S. (1993). Innovative productivity and returns to scale in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Strategic Management Journal, 14(8), 593-605. 
Griliches, Z. (1990). Patent statistics as economic indicators: A survey: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
	Hagedoorn, J. and Duysters, G. (2002). External sources of innovative capabilities: The preferences 
for strategic alliances or mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Management Studies, 39, 167-
188. 
Hall, L. A. and Bagchi-Sen, S. (2002). A study of R&D, innovation, and business performance in the 
Canadian biotechnology industry. Technovation, 22(4), 231-244. 
Halpern, P. J. (1973). Empirical estimates of the amount and distribution of gains to companies in 
mergers. The Journal of Business, 46(4), 554-575. 
Haspeslagh, P. C. and Jemison, D. B. (1991). The challenge of renewal through acquisitions. Planning 
Review, 19(2), 27-30. 
He, Z.-L. and Wong, P.-K. (2004). Exploration vs. exploitation: An empirical test of the ambidexterity 
hypothesis. Organization science, 15(4), 481-494. 
Hicks, D., Breitzman, T., Olivastro, D. and Hamilton, K. (2001). The changing composition of 
innovative activity in the US—a portrait based on patent analysis. Research Policy, 30(4), 
681-703. 
Jaffe, A. B. (1986). Technological opportunity and spillovers of R&D: evidence from firms' patents, 
profits and market value: National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA. 
Jansen, J. J., Van Den Bosch, F. A. and Volberda, H. W. (2005). Managing potential and realized 
absorptive capacity: How do organizational antecedents matter? Academy of Management 
Journal, 48(6), 999-1015. 
Katila, R. and Ahuja, G. (2002). Something old, something new: A longitudinal study of search 
behavior and new product introduction. Academy of Management Journal, 45(6), 1183-1194. 
King, D. R., Slotegraaf, R. J. and Kesner, I. (2008). Performance implications of firm resource 
interactions in the acquisition of R&D-intensive firms. Organization science, 19(2), 327-340. 
Lerner, J., Tirole, J. and Strojwas, M. (2003). Cooperative marketing agreements between competitors: 
evidence from patent pools: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Levin, R. C., Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R. R., Winter, S. G., Gilbert, R. and Griliches, Z. (1987). 
Appropriating the returns from industrial research and development. Brookings papers on 
economic activity, 1987(3), 783-831. 
Levinthal, D. and March, J. G. (1981). A model of adaptive organizational search. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 2(4), 307-333. 
Lounamaa, P. H. and March, J. G. (1987). Adaptive coordination of a learning team. Management 
science, 33(1), 107-123. 
Lubatkin, M. (1983). Mergers and the performance of the acquiring firm. Academy of management 
review, 8(2), 218-225. 
Lubatkin, M. (1987). Merger strategies and stockholder value. Strategic Management Journal, 8(1), 
39-53. 
Majumdar, S. K. and Venkataraman, S. (1993). New technology adoption in US telecommunications: 
The role of competitive pressures and firm-level inducements. Research Policy, 22(5), 521-
536. 
Makri, M., Hitt, M. A. and Lane, P. J. (2010). Complementary technologies, knowledge relatedness, 
and invention outcomes in high technology mergers and acquisitions. Strategic Management 
Journal, 31(6), 602-628. 
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning. Organization science, 
2(1), 71-87. 
March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1976). Ambiguity and choice in organisations. Bergen: 
Universitetsforlaget, 37. 
Morton, F. M. S. (2002). Horizontal integration between brand and generic firms in the pharmaceutical 
industry. Journal of economics & management strategy, 11(1), 135-168. 
Nahavandi, A. and Malekzadeh, A. R. (1988). Acculturation in mergers and acquisitions. Academy of 
management review, 13(1), 79-90. 
Nohria, N. and Gulati, R. (1996). Is slack good or bad for innovation? Academy of Management 
Journal, 39(5), 1245-1264. 
	Paruchuri, S., Nerkar, A. and Hambrick, D. C. (2006). Acquisition integration and productivity losses 
in the technical core: Disruption of inventors in acquired companies. Organization science, 
17(5), 545-562. 
Phelps, C. C. (2010). A longitudinal study of the influence of alliance network structure and 
composition on firm exploratory innovation. Academy of Management Journal, 53(4), 890-
913. 
Quintana-García, C. and Benavides-Velasco, C. A. (2008). Innovative competence, exploration and 
exploitation: The influence of technological diversification. Research Policy, 37(3), 492-507. 
Rosenkopf, L. and Nerkar, A. (2001). Beyond local search: Boundaryspanning, exploration, and 
impact in the optical disk industry. Strategic Management Journal, 22(4), 287-306. 
Sampson, R. C. (2007). R&D alliances and firm performance: The impact of technological diversity 
and alliance organization on innovation. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2), 364-386. 
Schoonhoven, C. B., Eisenhardt, K. M. and Lyman, K. (1990). Speeding products to market: Waiting 
time to first product introduction in new firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 177-207. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (2013). Capitalism, socialism and democracy: Routledge. 
Silverman, B. S. (1999). Technological resources and the direction of corporate diversification: 
Toward an integration of the resource-based view and transaction cost economics. 
Management science, 45(8), 1109-1124. 
Singh, J. V. (1986). Performance, slack, and risk taking in organizational decision making. Academy of 
Management Journal, 29(3), 562-585. 
Thompson, D. E. (2001). Get big enough (but not too big) to source innovation. Research Technology 
Management, 44(6), 22. 
Valentini, G. (2012). Measuring the effect of M&A on patenting quantity and quality. Strategic 
Management Journal, 33(3), 336-346. 
Van Deusen, C. A. and Mueller, C. B. (1999). Learning in acquisitions: Understanding the relationship 
between exploration, exploitation and performance. The Learning Organization, 6(4), 186-
193. 
Weber, Y. and Pliskin, N. (1996). The effects of information systems integration and organizational 
culture on a firm's effectiveness. Information & Management, 30(2), 81-90. 
Weber, Y., Shenkar, O. and Raveh, A. (1996). National and corporate cultural fit in 
mergers/acquisitions: An exploratory study. Management science, 42(8), 1215-1227. 
Weber, Y., Tarba, S. Y. and Rozen Bachar, Z. (2012). The effects of culture clash on international 
mergers in the high tech industry. World Review of Entrepreneurship, Management and 
Sustainable Development, 8(1), 103-118. 
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resourcebased view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5(2), 171-
180. 
Yin, X. and Shanley, M. (2008). Industry determinants of the “merger versus alliance” decision. 
Academy of management review, 33(2), 473-491. 
Zaheer, A., Hernandez, E. and Banerjee, S. (2010). Prior alliances with targets and acquisition 
performance in knowledge-intensive industries. Organization science, 21(5), 1072-1091. 
Zajac, E. J., Golden, B. R. and Shortell, S. M. (1991). New organizational forms for enhancing 
innovation: The case of internal corporate joint ventures. Management science, 37(2), 170-
184. 
Zhang, J., Baden-Fuller, C. and Mangematin, V. (2007). Technological knowledge base, R&D 
organization structure and alliance formation: Evidence from the biopharmaceutical industry. 
Research Policy, 36(4), 515-528. 
 
